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The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix*
Arthur R. Miller**
L THE EVILS OF COST AND DELAY
The inefficiency with which the wheels of justice grind is
not unique to our time. In ancient China, a peasant who re-
sorted to the courts was considered ruined, no matter what the
eventual outcome of the suit. Hamlet rued "the law's delay."
Goethe quit the legal profession in disgust over cases that had
been languishing in the German courts for three hundred
years. And in Bleak House Charles Dickens applied his great
talent for social criticism to the ramifications of one of the clas-
sic examples of English legal ineptitude-Jarndyce v. Jarndyce.
It is in this tradition that today the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court can be counted on to devote at least one
major public address every year to the subject of improving the
quality and increasing the speed of the administration of
justice.
The inability of the American judicial system to adjudicate
civil disputes economically and efficiently is one of the most
pressing issues facing the courts today. It is axiomatic that jus-
tice delayed is justice denied. From the perspective of most
people ensnared in the litigation process, a half-decade wait for
the resolution of a serious dispute is intolerable. Major busi-
ness ventures cannot wait that long to have the legality of their
activities tested. Many courthouse supplicants simply cannot
pay their medical bills and feed their families for years without
being recompensed for disabling injuries received in highway
or industrial accidents. Nor should ghetto dwellers have to re-
main in a rat-infested apartment building for months on end
awaiting a court to compel their slumlord to take action. Those
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with modest claims or who are enmeshed in simple cases
should not be forced to wait in a courthouse queue that has all
the trappings of a judicial gridlock. In a world in which com-
puters operate in nanoseconds and people travel to the moon in
a few days, four or five years is a long time indeed to wait to
have one's day in court. Moreover, the escalating cost of litiga-
tion, coupled with intolerable delay, leads to an overall finan-
cial and emotional price tag for justice that often is beyond the
means of all but the wealthy and sturdy.
On the one hand, the prospect of being involved with the
"law" for a period of this magnitude and at this cost chills the
enthusiasm and debilitates the resolve of many a citizen with a
legitimate grievance against a neighbor, employer, merchant, or
government. Those who are cowed may refrain from bringing
suit and nurse their wounds as best they can, often building up
and reinforcing antagonisms toward society's "them's" and
"it's" who, they are convinced, have subjugated them once
again. Or perhaps they will accept a settlement, often dis-
counted by an amount that reflects the value of avoiding five
years of combat in the courts but that may not represent the
fair market value of the claim.
On the other hand, those with nerves of steel and a
crusader's spirit will run the gauntlet of the judicial system.
Would-be gladiators with strong hearts but comparatively weak
pocketbooks will become co-venturers with their attorneys by
entering into contingent fee arrangements, under which the at-
torney agrees to champion the client's cause for a stated per-
centage of the ultimate take, if any. Of course, this kind of
economics means that unless the attorney feels the claim is a
"sure thing" or will command a sizeable settlement, the case
will languish while the attorney pursues others that are more
likely to produce "a piece of the action."
II. THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION
The current state of affairs usually is attributed to what is
called the "litigation explosion." Ever since World War II, and
especially during the past twenty-five years, litigants have been
flocking to the courts in unprecedented numbers.' Americans,
1. See W. McLAucHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS (1984) (quantitative
analysis of caseloads in federal courts); see also V. FLANGO, R. ROPER & M. ELS-
NER, THE BUSINESS OF STATE TRiAL CotinTs (1983) (same for state courts).
Moreover, the number of time-consuming, complex cases in federal courts has
grown strikingly in recent years. See American College of Tiial Lawyers, Rec-
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it is said, are without question the most litigious people on
earth, with one lawyer for every four hundred people-three
times as many lawyers per capita as Germany and twenty
times as many as Japan.2 Small wonder, therefore, that in the
decade of the 1970's, federal district court filings more than
doubled and trials lasting over thirty days more than tripled.3
To understand the real reasons for the litigation explosion,
however, one must dig beneath the cliches and avoid being daz-
zled by the statistics. The tremendous increase in litigation is a
result of changes in the character and makeup of the legal pro-
fession, massive growth in the number of substantive rights
recognized by American law, some unfortunate side effects of
policies and procedures embodied in our extremely permissive
and forgiving procedural system, and the unique economics of
the American legal system.
A. THE CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Dramatic changes over the past two decades in the compo-
sition and temperament of the legal profession have contrib-
uted to the increased resort to litigation in America. While the
number of attorneys has doubled since 1960,4 the rise of the no-
fault concept in auto insurance and divorce law at least par-
tially has closed off two extremely lucrative and steady sources
of income for a significant portion of the litigating bar. The
competition among more lawyers for the available business,
coupled with the foreclosure of these traditional litigation op-
portunities, has sent attorneys questing after new and different
areas of practice.5 Moreover, law students have become more
litigation-oriented, particularly with the advent of curriculum
offerings in trial practice, clinical education, professional re-
sponsibility, and advocacy.6 Contemporary legal education fos-
ommendations on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 209-
10 (1981).
2. See Bok, A Flawed System, HARv. MAG. 38, 40 (May-June 1983), re-
printed in 33 J. LEGAL Enuc. 570, 571 (1983); Kester, Are Lawyers Becoming
Public Enemy Number One, THE WASHmnGTONiAN 114, 116 (Feb. 1984).
3. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770, 770 (1981); see
also Granelli, Long Trials Play Havoc With Courts, Nat'l 14., Dec. 27, 1982, at 1,
col 4 (discussing increase of protracted trials and causes thereof).
4. Bok, supra note 2, at 40, reprinted in J. LEGAL EDUC. at 571.
5. Class action, securities, and antitrust litigation are among the areas
that have grown as a result of this "retread" phenomenon. Miller & Culp, Liti-
gation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J, Nov.
28, 1983, at 24.
6. See Bok, supra note 2, at 45, reprinted in J. LEGAL EDUC. at 582-83.
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ters a cult of civil litigation by training more and more trial
lawyers, which is somewhat ironic since in many parts of the
nation more than ninety percent of civil suits never even reach
trial.7
Moreover, many of the young litigators, who account for
much of the expansion in the profession, were educated during
the social upheaval of the 1960's and early 1970's, a period when
it was fashionable to emphasize litigation as a weapon in the
fight for social and political justice, civil rights, environmental
protection, consumerism, and employee safety. Many of the
student rebels and reformers of that period have become the
ideological advocates of the 1980's. Thus, a significant segment
of the bar is willing and eager to institute lawsuits, often as
class actions,8 that would not have been brought in times past
because no cadre of "public interest" lawyers was available to
take up the cudgels merely to pursue points of principle. 9 Al-
though today's law students seem somewhat less idealistic
than their predecessors, the continued popularity of clinical
programs providing legal services for the poor and disadvan-
taged indicates that the commitment to using the law as an in-
strument of social justice has not waned.' 0
The natural tendency of lawyers to be competitive is en-
couraged by the lowering of certain barriers that the profession
once imposed on its own conduct. Lawyers are given a freer
rein to promote themselves through advertising and, although
frowned upon in the more genteel quarters of the bar, advertis-
ing has become a significant way of luring potential plaintiffs
who might not have resorted to the courts absent the siren call
of Madison Avenue techniques and optimistic accounts of pots
of gold at the end of the litigation rainbow." Another develop-
7. Miller & Culp, supra note 5, at 24. In fact, the percentage of those cases
terminated in federal district courts that ever reach trial has decreased from
10.0% in 1970 to 5.4% in 1983. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES
CouRTs, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Table 29, at 142 (1983) [herein-
after cited as 1983 REPORT].
8. See generally Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L REv. 664 (1979)
(describing increased use of class action device and factors contributing
thereto).
9. Kester, supra note 2, at 141-42 ("Whatever subsidizes legal services
subsidizes added litigation.").
10. See Miller, supra note 8, at 675.
11. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertis-
ing is commercial speech protected by first amendment); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (fee schedule published by county bar association
constitutes price-fixing under Sherman Act).
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ment is the tolerance of certain practices relating to finding
plaintiffs and funding lawsuits, most notably in the class action
context, that once would have been branded as solicitation,
champerty, and maintenance.12 This is not to say that these
practices should be condemned. Indeed, improving both the
flow of information and the availability of new types of group-
based litigation to those in need of legal redress is desirable.
But the effect is to increase the volume of business that must
be handled by our already-overburdened courts.
B. THE GROWTH iN SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
The rise in court filings also can be attributed in part to the
recognition and enlargement of substantive rights. Over the
last twenty-five years we have witnessed the wholesale crea-
tion of new causes of action-by both statute and court deci-
sion-and an increase in legal confrontation between citizen
and government involving the tremendous expansion of federal
regulation. Today, we Americans enjoy more rights than any
people on the face of the earth, but these rights inevitably
breed lawsuits. After all, if people are given rights, one should
not be surprised when they assert them.
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's Congress seemed to be
operating a "new-right-of-the-month club." Largely as a result
of two pieces of legislation-the Civil Rights Act of 196413 and
the Voting Rights Act of 196514--the number of federal civil
rights cases alone increased by a factor of more than twenty-
five between 1960 and 1972.15 The same societal forces that fu-
eled the civil rights movement also impelled Congress to re-
spond to other demands for justice, and new statutory rights of
action became available in the environmental, consumer, polit-
ical rights, and safety fields.
Congress has not been the only actor in this process, how-
ever. The sensitivity of courts in recent years to due process
12. See Miller, supra note 8; see also A. MLLER, AN OvER vEw OF CLASS
AcnONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FrrrTu (Federal Judicial Center 1977).
13. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982); 42 id.§§ 1971, 1975a-19754 2000a to 2000h-6).
14. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1982)).
15. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial En.
forcement of Constitutional Protections (pt. 1), 60 VA. L REv. 1, 1 (1974) (ap-
proximately 300 civil rights actions filed in fiscal year 1960 compared to 8,000 in
fiscal year 1972). See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1776 (1970 & Supp. 1983) (describing civil rights class actions
under Rule 23(b) (2) for injunctive or declaratory relief).
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and equal protection concerns has generated a myriad of cases
involving a kaleidoscopic range of matters that were not within
the standard litigation repertoire twenty-five years ago-dress
and hair codes, academic and government employment status,
prisoners' rights, and welfare benefits, to name a few. The
cases in these areas reflect the revolution in thinking about en-
titlements and private rights that raged in the courts and law
reviews during the late 1960's.16 Judicial recognition of new pri-
vate rights of action has encouraged the emergence of class ac-
tions based on conceptions of corporate democracy, consumer
rights, competitive behavior, and environmental protection. To-
day we may be facing a new wave of litigation, this one involv-
ing toxic substances. The success of such actions reflect both
increased pressure on the courts, particularly the federal
courts, to recognize new substantive rights and, to a degree, ju-
dicial acquiescence to that pressure.' 7
The frequent recognition of new legal rights, coupled with a
strong presumption in favor of deciding cases on their merits,
has made lower court judges extremely reluctant to terminate
private actions prior to trial. The result is that plaintiffs' attor-
neys, eyeing the prospects of surviving pretrial motions and
reaching the jury, giving them at least a chance for a substan-
tial verdict, have become increasingly inclined to institute ac-
tions pursuing less substantial violations of law and more
avant-garde theories of liability. Not surprisingly, many de-
fense attorneys have become sufficiently concerned about their
clients' potential exposure that they often counsel the discreet
course of settlement rather than running the risk of a trial.
This willingness to settle in itself encourages others to bring
suit. To the extent that the courts have leant a sympathetic ear
to new theories of entitlement and liability and have been un-
willing to terminate cases prior to trial, their bloated dockets
represent, in a sense, a self-inflicted wound.18
The federal courts also have become a forum for highly
complex and controversial matters involving big government,
16. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L REv. 91 (1966);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
17. See Kester, supra note 2, at 115 (characterizing this approach of Con-
gress as "a way to legislate that pushes tough political problems onto [the
courts]").
18. See id. at 117; Miller, supra note 8, at 670-75.
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big business, and a variety of public interest groups.' 9 Admin-
istrative agency action involving entitlement programs, govern-
ment grants for the needy, extensive regulation of business,
and environmental, consumer, and safety protection has been a
significant source of judicial business. The burden of oversight
has been placed on the courts, resulting in increased litigation
between the government and either individuals or businesses
affected by government activity. Intercorporate warfare in the
courts, particularly in the antitrust and competitive tort fields,
also has mushroomed. Virtually unknown ten or fifteen years
ago, waging intercorporate lawsuits has become "business by
other means" for many corporations.20
Of course, we probably have entered an era of retrench-
ment with respect to government regulation and the creation of
new substantive rights. The Supreme Court has become de-
monstrably less responsive to claims of due process violations 2 1
and is increasingly antagonistic toward judicial recognition of
implied rights of action.2 2 Moreover, the present administra-
tion is committed to deregulating the economy23 and narrowing
the scope of the Freedom of Information Act.24 Yet even if the
Court and the Executive Branch are completely successful in
halting the expansion of government and in cropping the
19. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Fed-
eral Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishmen4 57 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 680, 722-
23 (1983); see also Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 Ht av. L. REv. 465, 465-68 (1980) (noting that weighty
social issues often are at issue in the "new" institutional litigation).
20. See Miller, supra note 8, at 672-73.
21. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist, 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (peaceful wearing of armbands was within the protection of due
process clause) with Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (due process
clause does not require notice and hearing prior to imposition of corporal
punishment).
22. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (antitrust
treble damages recovery unavailable to indirect purchasers); Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (tender offerors do not have standing to sue
under § 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, designed to protect investors
solicited in a tender offer); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (shareholders have no
federal cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibits certain election
contributions by corporations).
23. Rosenbaum, 3 Cabinet Choices Breeze Through Senate Hearings, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7, 1981, at A16, coL 3.
24. See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1981, at A21, coL 5. As part of this effort, Presi-
dent Reagan signed an order widening the range of potentially classified gov-
ernment documents. See Raines, Reagan Order Tightens the Rules on
Disclosing Secret Information, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1982, at Al, col. 2. The order
effectively broadened the scope of an exemption to the Freedom of Information
Act covering classified documents. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1982).
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growth of new rights of action,25 it is unlikely that we will see
in our lifetime an actual diminution in the number of lawsuits
instituted.
C. OuR EGALITARIAN PROCEDURAL SYSTEM
Our procedures also tend to encourage litigation by facili-
tating access to the courthouse and ensuring survival once in-
side. Entry to the system is easy. Gone is the screening
function once performed by a particularized pleading require-
ment, which deterred suits by requiring enough knowledge and
preinstitution investigation to enable the plaintiff to make spe-
cific allegations regarding the defendant's conduct. The thresh-
hold barrier against frivolous litigation has been lowered by the
substitution of notice pleading for issue and fact pleading;26
there are virtually no effective control mechanisms or filtration
devices at the front end of the litigation process. Why have we
done this? Actually it is out of the purest of motives; our easy-
access procedures reflect the desire to provide all citizens with
the right to a day in court.27 But perhaps we have become vic-
tims of our own propaganda, which literally beckons potential
litigants with sweet talk of "equal access to justice."
The liberal and permissive Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, created as a model of simplicity in an age of relatively un-
complicated cases, may be contributing to the protraction of
cases in today's era of complex regulation and behemoth dis-
putes.28 In our zeal to enable everyone to dine at the "Justice
25. The deregulation efforts of the Administration, however, likely will
stimulate litigation. For example, the Administration has announced major
changes in federal air pollution regulations of the Environmental Protection
Agency that almost certainly will generate legal challenges. See Farnsworth,
U.S. Proposes Eased Car Standards, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, at Al, col. 2. The
same probably is true of the changes regarding the application of the Freedom
of Information Act to classified documents. See supra note 24.
26. The Supreme Court has characterized pleading under the federal rules
as "notice pleading." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). But see Clark,
Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (objecting to
such characterization as nebulous). The Federal Rules, however, do require
detailed pleading with respect to a small number of special matters. FED. R.
Civ. P. 9; see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1291-1315 (1969 & Supp. 1983) (describing pleading special matters).
27. See Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 264, 266, 277-78 (1979).
28. Judge Clark's famous opinion in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d
Cir. 1944) (reversing the district court's dismissal of Dioguardi's "inartistically"
drawn amended complaint), cited with approval in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 46 n.6 (1957), became "a focal point of opposition to the so-called liberal 'no-
tice-pleading' of the Federal Rules." J. COUND, J. FRiEDENrHAL & A. MILLER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 394 (3d ed. 1980); see, e.g., McCaskill,
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trough," all we ask of claimants is that they tell us where it
hurts and what they want in a "short and plain statement of
the claim,"29 making it virtually impossible to stop a litigant at
the courthouse door. Once inside, it is like floating in space,
with no restraints or gravitational forces to drag a litigant
down. Motions to dismiss are not difficult to survive.30 Appel-
late courts have cautioned against premature termination, mak-
ing a provision like Federal Rule 12(b) (6) something of an
artifact. 3 1 Nor is the motion for summary judgment an effective
filter for marginal or frivolous cases. In the federal system, dis-
trict judges have been encouraged by certain Supreme Court
decisions to believe that complicated cases should not be dis-
posed of by summary judgment,3 2 producing a better-safe-than-
sorry judicial approach.
Having survived the preliminary motions, it is just a hop-
skip-and-a-jump into the quicksand of discovery, a debilitating
and often interminable process. This pretrial structure permits
artful attorneys to hide the ball and keep alive hopeless claims,
as well as defenses, for a much longer time than was possible
under the more arduous, discarded procedural systems of the
past. In many ways, contemporary federal litigation is analo-
gous to the dance marathon contests of yesteryear. The object
of the exercise is to select a partner from across the "v," get out
on the dance floor, hang on to one's client, and then drift aim-
lessly and endlessly to the litigation music for as long as possi-
ble, hoping that everyone else will collapse from exhaustion.
D. EcoNoMIC INCENTIVES TO LITIGATE
Not only do our procedures make entry into the courthouse
easy and survival virtually automatic, but the economics of con-
The Modem Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A.
J. 123 (1952) (sharply criticizing the Dioguardi decision).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
30. See FED. . CIV. P. 15 (liberal provisions for amendment of pleadings).
31. Motions under Federal Rule 12(b) (6) for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted" rarely are successful The Supreme Court has
stated:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would support relief.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4546 (1957). See 5 C. Warirr & A. Mu.±~, FEt-
ERAL PRACTICE AND-PROCEDURE § 1357 (1969).
32. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962)




temporary litigation actually creates an incentive to resort to
the courts. The "American rule" of letting costs lie where they
fall removes a powerful disincentive to legal combat that is
present in most other countries-the knowledge that the loser
must pay the litigation costs, including attorneys' fees, of the
winner.33 This cost-shifting discourages the bringing of margi-
nal claims by imposing the risk of bearing double costs. But al-
lowing the winner to recover costs from the loser is
inconsistent with the American dream of providing everyone
with easy access to justice by eliminating as many barriers to
the courthouse as possible.34 Further, discouraging attorneys
from pursuing novel or "frontier" legal theories, when the risk
of bearing double costs is the highest, would impair what many
feel is one of the chief virtues of the American justice system,
the creativity of the bar. Unfortunately, the price tag for this
otherwise unobjectionable attitude is an elevated litigation
rate.
Moreover, the availability of contingent fee arrangements-
a uniquely American institution-makes it possible for cases to
be brought that would not be economically viable if plaintiffs
had to fund them up front.35 Once again, however, the laudable
33. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
247 (1975); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 306, 306 (1796); see also A.
MILLER, ArroRuEys' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS 12-21 (Federal Judicial Center
1980) (discussing the no-fee rule and exceptions to it).
Compare the English practice of including counsel fees in costs recover-
able by the successful party, described in Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856-
59 (1929). For proposals that we adopt some variation of the English system,
see Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv.
75 (1963); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20
VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967). See also Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I:
The English Mode4 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1070, 1113-15 (1975) (discussing the impact
of the English cost-shifting system on the efficacy of pretrial management by
magistrates).
34. See Kuenzel, supra note 33, at 81. For other views on the reasons be-
hind the no-fee rule, see Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the
Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 798-99 (1966) (no-fee rule developed be-
cause of mistake of 1848 New York legislature in fixing the amount of attorneys'
fees recoverable in dollars and cents rather than in percentage of the amount
claimed or recovered); Goodhart, supra note 33, at 873 (rule stems from popular
distrust of lawyers). Even if one rejects the view that the American rule grew
out of a policy favoring unfettered access to the courtroom, it nonetheless is ev-
ident that the absence of the in terrorem effect of the English rule reduces the
risk of litigation. See Kuenzel, supra note 33, at 78.
35. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility notes that contin-
gent fee arrangements "have long been commonly accepted in the United
States in proceedings to enforce [civil] claims" and that such arrangements
"provide the only practical means by which one having a claim against another
can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer
to prosecute his claim." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-20
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aim of making justice accessible to all is achieved at the cost of
a higher incidence of litigation. Add to this the growing phe-
nomenon of court-awarded attorneys' fees under approximately
one hundred federal statutes,36 which offers a sweetener above
and beyond the relief awarded to the plaintiff, and one begins
to recognize that there is a substantial economic incentive to
litigate in certain substantive contexts.37
Finally, in some circumstances our tax system actually en-
courages litigants to drag out their litigation. For example, in
the business arena the tax deductibility of litigation expenses
means that the government is, in effect, subsidizing lawsuits.
For a defendant it may be more economical to stall cases by
paying tax deductible, albeit huge, legal fees in order to defer
payment of the ultimate judgment or even a "reasonable" set-
tlement.38 There is also the possibility that if one lasts long
enough in the dance marathon contest, the ravages of time and
expense may cause the opponent to give up and go away.39
E. SuMMARY
The crowded condition of our nation's courts really is quite
understandable. Today's litigation environment is plagued by
regulatory schemes that are byzantine in their complexity, a
(1980). The Model Code explicitly excepts contingent fee contracts from the
prohibition against acquiring a proprietary interest in a client's cause of action.
See id. DR 5-103 (A) (2) & DR 2-106(B) (8) (1980).
Professor David L. Shapiro has characterized the contingent fee system as
"the American analogue-similar in some ways, quite different in others-to
the English practice of requiring the loser to pay the winner's legal fees." Sha-
piro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L REv. 735, 781
(1980). For a comprehensive discussion of contingency fee arrangements, see
MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964). See also Comment,
Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The Problem,
the Duty and a Solution, 26 U. Prrr. L REV. 811, 829 (1965) (noting that contin-
gent fee arrangements are not well-suited to all types of legal actions).
36. E.g, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982); see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61
n.33 (1975) (listing federal statutes authorizing payment of attorneys' fees); 3
H. NEwBERG, CLASS AcnoNs § 7040 (1977 & Supps. 1980, 1984) (same).
37. See Kester, supra note 2, at 116-17 (questioning the wisdom of granting
fee awards under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act at top hourly
rates in cases that would have neither commanded nor required such high-
priced legal talent).
38. See Sofaer, supra note 19, at 721.
39. See Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Law-
yers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 Am. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 219,
229 (forcing adversary to settle or to dismiss claim are two motivations for ex-
cessive discovery); Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse: Sanctions Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the California Code of Civil Procedure. 21
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1981) (same).
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procedural system that encourages people to have a day in
court regardless of the social cost, cost-allocation rules that
make ideological or purely tactical advocacy economically via-
ble, a plethora of substantive rights for all to seize upon, and a
corps of litigators just itching for action. Although our commit-
ment to equal access to justice is laudable, one must begin to
question whether we can continue to afford the present system.
III. POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR REFORM
Suggested solutions to the crisis in our courts caused by
the litigation explosion are as varied as its causes. One way to
attack the problem of too many cases for too few judges is sim-
ply to increase the number of judges on the bench. Another
option is to affect the other end of the equation-to cut the
number of cases by reversing the expansion of substantive
rights that has contributed to the current congestion. Another,
and perhaps more promising, possibility is to improve the way
in which the existing system works. This approach, embodied
in recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
emphasizes greater use of judicial management techniques by
trial judges as the most realistic and efficient way of getting the
greatest quantity of justice from our courts.
A. THE APPOINTMENT OF MORE JUDGES
The rate of appointment of additional judges has not
matched the increased demand for the services of the judicial
system. Nor, in all honesty, could it. America has a staggering
profusion of courts-federal, state, city, probate, small claims,
divorce, juvenile, and tax. Staffing the benches of these various
tribunals, even at existing levels, consumes a substantial por-
tion of the pool of highly competent lawyers who are politically
acceptable and willing to be distracted from the more lucrative
arena of private practice. In some parts of the country an in-
crease in judicial salaries might attract a few more good judges,
but unless this increase is accompanied by money for addi-
tional clerks, secretaries, librarians, books, courthouses, and
court reporters, the system is not likely to run any more
smoothly than it does now.
Moreover, simply expanding the system offers no panacea.
Even if sufficient funds were available to hire enough judges to
handle the avalanche of cases, such an expansion is likely to
have the unfortunate result of reducing the overall quality of
the judiciary unless great care is taken in the appointment pro-
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cess. Not only would there be more judgeships to fill from the
same pool of legal talent, but the mere increase in the number
of judges also would dilute the intangible rewards that draw
candidates to the bench-the prestige, status, and uniqueness
of a judgeship.40 These problems, combined with this nation's
reluctance to expend substantial sums on the administration of
justice, make it unlikely that simply expanding the existing
system is a pragmatic or realistic approach. Indeed, increasing
the number of judges might simply attract more cases.
B. CURTAILMENT OR DIVERSION OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
Attempts to force a reduction in the number of cases filed
by constricting, or even eliminating, presently available sub-
stantive rights seem both unwise as a policy matter and
doomed to failure. There are simply too many statutes on the
books, too many precedents in the reporters, and too many ad-
vocates seeking clients to hope that somehow the tidal wave of
lawsuits will recede in the near future. Nor can we undo what
has been done. The elimination of rights that have been
achieved by various segments of the population is not only un-
feasible, but undesirable.
Nor is the magic elixir to be found among the ancient nos-
trums peddled by savants who advocate the wholesale removal
of certain classes of cases, such as automobile accident litiga-
tion, from the courts. Closing the courthouse door on potential
claimants is a sufficiently desperate cure for revitalizing the ju-
dicial process that it should be held in abeyance until less dras-
tic surgery has been tried. Moreover, shifting part of the
burden from the courts to administrative agencies, arbitration
panels, or other "specialized" tribunals smacks of robbing Pe-
ter to pay PauL4 1
C. IMPROVEMENT OF SYSTEMIC EFFICIENCY
We cannot do much about the demand for our scarce judi-
cial resources. The demographic changes in the profession to
some degree are beyond our power to control. A quantitative
expansion of our judicial capacity seems to be a dead end.
What then is the solution? Perhaps it begins by recognizing
40. Kester, supra note 2, at 117; see also Rosenberg, Devising Procedures
that are Civil to Promote Justice that is Civilized, 69 Mic. L REv. 797, 800 (re-
jecting the "add-judges" approach to improving the system).
41. But see Kester, supra note 2, at 143 (encouraging greater use of arbitra-
tion in certain contexts).
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that much of the existing problem results from the underlying
inefficiency of our procedures and methodology.42 What is
needed are qualitative changes in how we use the resources we
do have.
Our first line of attack in meeting the litigation crisis must
be an attempt to improve the processing of cases that are on
the dockets of our courts. It is self-evident that delay exacer-
bates congestion, and every case that languishes on the calen-
dar tends to create its own churning effect. The limited
empirical evidence we have suggests that the longer a case sits
unattended, the more work it eventually will generate for the
system.4 3
Fundamental changes are needed in the way we handle the
cases as they come through the courthouse door. More specifi-
cally, the key lies in controlling the pretrial process. Concerns
about the trial phase are misplaced since over ninety percent of
the cases in most courts terminate through settlement or dis-
missal prior to trial.44 Furthermore, judicial energy put into
managing a case effectively during pretrial should pay off even
in the minority of cases that ultimately go to trial. A well-man-
aged case will be tried more efficiently since the judge, at least
under an individual assignment calendar, will have become
familar with it, and issues will have been narrowed and extra-
neous conflicts excised. Reform of the trial process, therefore,
is too little, too late; rather, shortening the time frame between
institution and termination in those cases that never reach trial
and streamlining pretrial in those cases that do go to trial offers
some real potential for progress.
The strong judicial activity throughout pretrial that is re-
quired to control this phase of litigation is contrary to both the
traditional conception of the judge as a neutral and passive ar-
biter and the notion that the pretrial system is a self-executing
and cooperative phase. This vision of a lack of judicial involve-
ment during pretrial has retained its vitality for many years as
evidenced, for example, by the 1970 amendment to Federal
42. See S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 17 (Federal Judicial Center 1977) (studying ef-
fectiveness of judicial management in expediting the handling of cases).
43. See id. at 13-16, 74-76 (suggesting methods to reduce backlog of cases),
P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL
LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 67-70 (Federal Judicial Center 1978) (discuss-
ing correlation between judicial controls during discovery and more rapid pro-
gress through other stages of case) [hereinafter cited as JuDIciAL CoNTnOLS:
DISCOVERY].
44. See upra note 7.
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Rule 34 making document discovery operate extrajudicially.45
Unfortunately, however, the ideal of a smooth pretrial pro-
cess engineered and controlled by the attorneys has not been
realized, especially in complex and difficult cases. 46 The vision
that adversarial tigers would behave like accommodating pus-
sycats throughout the discovery period, saving their combative
energies for trial; has not materialized.4 7 Given the realities of
modern large-scale litigation, the rulemakers' expectations for
a self-executing, cooperative pretrial phase have proven to be
somewhat naive. Attorneys have neither cooperated volunta-
rily to move cases through discovery nor policed each other by
seeking sanctions for abusive discovery tactics. 48 The truth is
that we have a pretrial system characterized by over-litigious-
ness, hyperactivity, and marginal behavior by attorneys, pro-
ducing excessive cost and delay.4 9 What has gone wrong? Why
has the vision underlying the Federal Rules become distorted
in so much of today's litigation?
45. See FED. R. Crv. P. 34 and advisory committee note to 1970 amendment;
see also 8 C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2207
(1970).
46. See Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L REv. 806, 819 (1981)
(noting the inability of the legal community to "devise... a self-executing set
of ideal rules" to control discovery).
47. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298-1302 (1978) (describing opti-
mistic hopes of rulemakers for cooperation during pretrial).
48. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J, concur-
ring) (referring to "the widespread abuse of discovery that has become a prime
cause of delay and expense in civil litigation"); ACF Industries, Inc. v. EEOC,
439 U.S. 1081, 1087 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("I have
referred briefly to the concern that exists with respect to abuse of discovery to
emphasize that, at least until rule changes can be made, there is a pressing
need for judicial supervision in this area."); Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 997-1001 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from the
adoption of 1980 amendments to the federal discovery rules and urging more
comprehensive reforms) [hereinafter cited as Powell dissenting statement];
SEGAL, SURVEY OF THE LiTERATURE ON DISCOVERY FRoM 1970 TO THE PRESEN-
EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFoRMS 67 (Federal Judicial
Center 1978) (observing consensus that main abuses are overdiscovery and
avoidance of discovery requests); Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse
in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L REv. 579 (proposing rules
amendments designed to avoid the "excesses of redundancy and disproportion-
ality" in discovery).
49. Many judges, practitioners, and commentators have assailed the
gamesmanship, harassment, overdiscovery, evasion, delay, and spiralling costs
that currently afflict the pretrial process. See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 47. Sev-
eral other sources are cited in Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pre-
trial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and
Sanctions, 1981 Ai. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 873, 880 n.13, 882 n.27 [hereinafter
cited as Improving Judicial Controls].
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The answer, in part, hes in the fact that the real battle-
ground in contemporary complex civil litigation has become the
pretrial stage. That is where adversarial energies and ingenu-
ity most often are focused. It is a battleground traditionally
controlled by attorneys who do not necessarily share the sys-
temic interest in swift and efficient movement of cases toward
trial. Although the announced aim of the judicial system is to
work from institution to disposition with efficiency and cooper-
ation, it is not necessarily to the advantage of either party to do
so. To the contrary, it is almost certain that in complex cases it
will be in the interest of one side or the other to drag out the
pretrial proceedings.0
This intentional delay is the inevitable consequence of the
reality that the outcome of complex cases today is likely to be
affected dramatically, if not determined, by what happens dur-
ing pretrial. For example, class actions stand or fall based on
whether they are certified, and for an attorney the critical
phase of the action may be the appointment of lead counsel. In
other situations success may turn on information elicited
through discovery to flesh out claims and defenses or to ascer-
tain where jurisdiction lies. Not only do many of these prag-
matic decision points occur before trial, but they have nothing
to do with the merits of the action. Attorneys, steeped in the
grand tradition of the litigator, are trained to be aggressive, ad-
versarial animals and to employ every weapon in their arsenal
to achieve the aims of their clients and to frustrate those of
their opponents. It is unrealistic to expect them to act in a co-
operative spirit or adhere to Marquess of Queensberry rules on
what has become the central battlefield of modern litigation.5 1
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON IMPROVING SYSTEMIC
EFFICIENCY
Meaningful reform of the existing litigation system re-
quires rethinking many of the assumptions on which it is
based. It must start, as already suggested, with a reevaluation
of the entire pretrial process and of the assumption that it suc-
cessfully can be left to attorneys to control and manage. But
50. Brazil, supra note 39, at 231-32. Brazil reports that his survey results
indicate that "in larger case litigation ... the problem of delay appears to be
more often a production of intentional jockeying than it is in the smaller
cases." Id. at 231.
51. See Improving Judicial Controls, supra note 49, at 880-84, 928-30; Brazil,
supra note 47, at 1303-05, 1311-15; Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1032, 1054 (1975).
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the reappraisal must go further. It must include an examina-
tion of the adversary system itself and ask whether the roles
that have been assigned to lawyers and judges are appropriate,
whether these players can be made to function more effec-
tively, and whether we can afford to allow the current econom-
ics of litigation to remain as it is.
A. THE NEED TO UPGRADE ATTORNEY BEHAVIOR
The chief source of frustration in processing cases is not
outright rule violations or disobedience of court orders but
rather sheer overuse of the system, which can take the form of
frivolous claims, sham defenses, unnecessary motions, or abuse
of the discovery system. This hyperactivity results from a vari-
ety of motives, ranging from legitimate professional considera-
tions, such as doing the best and most thorough job possible for
one's client, to improper ones, such as harassment and driving
up the litigation costs of the opponent. This behavior is easily
explainable given a professional ethic mandating that lawyers
owe complete allegiance to their clients, very little to the sys-
tem, and none at all to the adversary.52
Prior to the current era of liberal discovery, the costs of
gathering information fell on the party seeking it. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have altered dramatically the natural
cost-benefit calculation that once had imposed some restraint
on the seeker of information, encouraging instead a better-safe-
than-sorry approach to discovery decisions that makes the car-
dinal rule: when in doubt, discover. Interrogatories and discov-
ery requests under Federal Rules 33 and 34, respectively, are at
least as costly to respond to as to formulate. Indeed, in an era
of boilerplate interrogatories formulated by young associates
and spewed out by word processors, masses of questions can
be churned out at low cost to the initiating party but at high
cost to the responding party. Given the American no-fee rule,
52. The Model Code exhorts the advocate to
urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client,
without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the
construction will ultimately prevail. His conduct is within the bounds
of the law, and therefore permissible, if the position taken is supported
by the law or is supportable by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of the law.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmrrY EC 7-4 (1980). Compare Ren-
frew, s-upra note 27, at 278-79 (discovery abuse stems from high stakes of litiga-
tion and desire for higher fees) with Friedenthal, s-upra note 46, at 817 (depth of
discovery attributable to attorneys' desire to avoid malpractice claims for over-
looking crucial information during discovery process).
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someone who wishes to abuse the system or simply to be over-
zealous or unduly optimistic is able to engage in a war of attri-
tion, raising the opposition's litigation costs with little fear that
those costs will come home to roost.5 3
In terms of lawyer economics pretrial hyperactivity gener-
ates billable hours-it keeps the meter running.54 Additionally,
until the recent recession there was little effective client con-
trol over, or interest shown in, the number of hours spent on
discovery or the number of motions made.5 5 Even if the client
does have a desire to contain litigation costs, the mystique sur-
rounding high-stakes litigation deters control by creating a per-
ception that good legal talent is pricey and that litigation is an
expensive undertaking. This impression may have become a
self-fufilling prophecy. Moreover, as already noted,5 6 the tax
deductibility of litigation expenses makes it cheaper in some
cases for defendants to pay legal fees in order to defer the pay-
ment of a monetary judgment or the imposition of injunctive
relief as long as possible.
Statutes providing for court-awarded fees exacerbate this
phenomenon. The shift in this area from percentage-of-the-re-
covery awards to the lodestar method of computing attorneys'
fees in terms of hours worked times normal billing rate57 pro-
vides an incentive to generate more litigation activity per case.
Conversely, in contingent fee cases, the client has little or no
meaningful incentive to control expenditures of lawyer time.
When prolonging pretrial and overuse of discovery are in
the interests of both client and attorney, hyperactivity natu-
rally follows. The combination of the mandate of zealous repre-
sentation of one's client and the attorney's own economic self-
interest provides a powerful inducement against efficient
processing of cases. In contrast, vague notions that attorneys
owe a duty to the judicial system by virtue of their status as
court officers are feeble counterweights in making day-to-day
tactical decisions. The cost of all this is substantial. Ulti-
mately, these patterns of delay impair the ability of others who
53. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
54. See Brazil, supra note 39, at 235 (reporting survey results indicating
that meter-running is a frequent abuse).
55. See Brazil, supra note 47, at 1314-15 (noting inability of clients to differ-
entiate between needed and wasteful discovery tactics).
56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
57. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L REv. 215, 239-43 (1983)
(general historical overview of this shift); see also A. Ma.LER, supra note 33, at
60-184 (circuit-by-circuit analysis of standards for fee awards).
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are in the queue waiting for their turn to gain access to justice
and increase the price of justice to the public, which eventually
finances a good portion of the cost of today's dance marathon
contests.
It is not intuitively obvious how to recast the litigation obli-
gations-of the lawyer. We have lived so long with the emphasis
on "duty to client" that redirecting the responsibilities of law-
yers to the system is easier said than done. Yet once it is un-
derstood that the court system is a societal resource, not
merely the private playpen of the litigants, the difficult task of
discouraging hyperactivity must be undertaken. 58
The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure represent a modest step in that direction.5 9 They attempt
to check abuses by requiring an attorney's signature on all liti-
gation papers-pleadings, motions, and discovery requests and
responses-certifying that, based on "reasonable inquiry,"
there is good ground to support the document and the signer's
motivation is not improper.60 The message is clear. An attor-
ney must "stop and think" before acting-that is the litigator's
duty to the system-or be subjected to sanctions. The determi-
nation of whether this is mere wishful thinking on the part of
the rulemakers or a harbinger of things to come must await fu-
ture evaluation as we accumulate experience with this type of
provision.
B. INCREASED JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
There is a growing feeling that the only means of preserv-
ing any substantial portion of the system may be to control the
excesses of lawyer hyperactivity through the infusion of active
judicial management from institution of a case to its termina-
tion.61 This approach ffies in the face of the traditional vision of
our system as one in which lawyers conduct cases and judges
58. See Brazil, supra note 47, at 1349 (proposing "shifting counsels' princi.
pal obligation during the investigation and discovery stage away from the parti-
san pursuit of clients' interests and toward the court"); Frankel, supra note 51,
at 1031 (stressing the attorney's primary obligation as a seeker of truth rather
than as a client's "hired gun").
59. See Sofaer, supra note 19, at 680 (evaluating 1983 amendments).
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3), 11 & 26 and advisory committee notes to
1983 amendment, see also Miller & Culp, The New Rules of Civil Procedure:
Managing Cases, Limiting Discovery, NAT'L L.T., Dec. 5, 1983 (discussing 1983
amendments to Rules 16 and 26).
61. See Renfrew, supra note 27, at 267 (advocating judicious use of sanc-
tions to help to make justice more accessible); Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A
Needfor Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 92-93 (1983) (emphasizing need
for improved judicial management).
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preside from a neutral distance, stepping in only to decide
questions and disputes that are framed by the advocates.
There has been understandable reluctance to tinker with, let
alone jeopardize or fundamentally alter, the basic tenets of a
system so entrenched and venerated. But given the tremen-
dous frustration throughout the legal profession and the public
at large with the current state of affairs, one must ask seriously
whether the adversary system as we know it has become too
costly and inefficient a device for resolving civil disputes.
Fortunately, the mood of the profession seems to be chang-
ing, largely because of increased caseloads. Since 1970 the
number of civil cases ified annually in federal district courts
has increased nearly threefold.62 During that same period,
however, the median time from filing to ultimate disposition ac-
tually decreased from ten to seven months.6 3 Quite clearly, a
large part of this improvement is attributable to more efficient
management by judges64 and increased assistance from profes-
sional administrators. 65 Indications are that judges are increas-
ingly concerned about various litigation practices and are
growing more receptive to suggestions that they actively par-
ticipate in the control of the pretrial process. 66
In short, the notion that judges should leave cases to the
lawyers has been compromised substantially by the wide-
spread frustration with the present situation and the resulting
recognition of the need for effective management. The Federal
Judicial Center's 1977 study of district court case management
procedures revealed that all the courts visited had procedures
designed to manage and control cases starting at their early
stages.67 The differences among the courts studied lay not in
their willingness to adopt methods to manage cases, for each
court had such procedures, but rather in the means employed,
their effectiveness in moving cases along expeditiously, and the
62. 1983 REPORT, supra note 7, Table 13, at 114 (241,842 cases filed in 1983
compared to 87,321 in 1960).
63. Compare id. Table C5A, at 282 with ADMimSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNTrED STATES CouRTs, ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Table C5, at 245i
(1970).
64. See Peckham, supra note 3, at 770.
65. See generally Solomon, The Training of Court Managers, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 683 (1981) (discussing increasing use and improved training of profes-
sional court administrators).
66. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text; see also infra note 89
(greater use of sanctions).
67. S. FLANDERS, supra note 42, at ix; see also Cohn, Federal Discovery: A
Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Fed-
eral Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253, 296 (1979).
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number of cases each judge could handle.68 The impact of case
management was dramatic, with courts employing strong man-
agement controls having an average disposition time for cases
that was approximately half of the average figure for courts us-
ing few such controls.69
Moreover, the impression that judges are unwilling to de-
part from their traditional role as passive and detached arbiters
appears to be mistaken. To the contrary, there seems to be a
strong spirit of willingness among judges to assume the role of
active managers and to experiment with procedures designed
to enhance their effectiveness in that role, although in some
quarters, particularly at the state level, the flesh of experience
and training may yet be weak. Significantly, follow-ups to an-
other Federal Judicial Center study found that participating
districts whose efficiency had been low had already adopted
procedures found to be common in the more efficient courts.7o
Even attorneys, usually seen as jealous guardians of con-
trol over their cases, are not averse to a stronger judicial
hand.71 Ironically, this is due in part to the natural tendency to
define abuse as what the opposition is doing to one. Lawyers
tend to see abusers not when they look in the mirror but rather
only when they look across the negotiating table or the court-
room. Given the frustration felt by many litigators about the
atmosphere of lawlessness that often bogs down actions
through hyperactivity, missed deadlines, and repeated
rescheduling, the judge is seen as an ally against a common en-
emy-the abusive opponent. Thus, the bar may not be a major
obstacle to more aggressive management and enforcement of
68. S. FLANDERS, supra note 42, at ix-x.
69. A table from the study is reproduced in relevant part below:




(a) settled cases 262 380 501
(b) tried cases 394 597 919
(c) settled or tried cases 283 402 543
Id Table 59, at 130.
70. P. CoNmoLLY & P. LOMBARD, JumncuL COmROLS AND THE Crvxi LrA-
TIVE PRocEss: MOTIONS x-xi (Federal Judicial Center 1980).
71. Based on the results of a recent ABA-sponsored empirical study of
lawyers' attitudes toward discovery problems, Professor Brazil reports that
80% of large case lawyers favor a more active judicial role in controlling the dis-
covery process and 90% favor more frequent imposition of sanctions for discov-
ery abuse. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectivenes., Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 787, 865-66.
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the rules, even at the expense of a measure of its independence
and autonomy.
C. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
In recent years, proposals have been made suggesting that
the most effective way to respond to the problem of overuse of
discovery is to narrow its scope from '"relevant to the subject
matter"72 of the action to "relevant to the issues" therein7 3 and
to impose limits on the number of interrogatories that can be
asked without leave of the court.74 Support for these proposals
has emphasized their symbolic value in indicating to litigants
that hyperactive discovery, especially when it amounts to a
fishing expedition or raw harassment, will not be tolerated.7 5
Opposition to such proposals, which thus far has pre-
vailed,7 6 focuses on the fact that they seem to represent a re-
treat to the bad old days of issue pleading.77 Although the
desirability of limiting cumulative and duplicative discovery is
generally acknowledged, placing the responsibility and initia-
tive for enforcement in the hands of private attorneys leaves
the door wide open for adversarial abuse. Satellite litigation re-
sulting from motions to limit discovery as beyond its legitimate
scope is likely to vitiate any time savings achieved by imposing
72. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
73. A.B.A., SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIrrEE FOR
THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE 2-3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as STUDY OF Dis-
COVERY ABUSE]. The former Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States recommended a slightly less restrictive modification requiring
that the information sought during discovery be "relevant to the claim or de-
fense" of one of the parties to the litigation. Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613, 623 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft]; see Brazil, supra note 47, at 1333-35.
74. STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, supra note 73, at 18, 20 (limiting parties to
30 questions as of right); Preliminary Draft supra note 73, at 645-49 (permitting
courts to set discretionary limits); see Brazil, supra note 47, at 1335-37.
75. E.g., Lindquist & Schechter, The New Relevancy: An End to Trial by
Ordeal, 64 A.B.A. J. 59 (1978); see also Powell dissenting statement, supra note
48.
76. When it submitted its revised proposals in 1979, the Advisory Commit-
tee withdrew the two controversial ones described above. In so doing, it ex-
pressed its preference for prompt judicial intervention to prevent threatened
discovery abuse, noting that abuse was "not so general as to require basic
changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases." Revised Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80
F.R.D. 323, 332 (1979).
77. E.g., Becker, Moden Discovery: Promoting Effcient Use and Prevent-





Furthermore, this cure may be worse than the disease.
Discovery appears to be a problem in only a comparatively
small percentage of cases. No discovery at all is employed in
fifty percent of the lawsuits instituted in the federal courts,79
and excessive discovery or unwarranted failure to produce in
response to discovery requests is not an issue in most of the re-
maining actions.8 0 The proposed remedy, therefore, is unneces-
sary in the majority of cases.8 1 If implemented in the
destructive adversarial atmosphere that currently exists, it sim-
ply might add more issues over which to skirmish to the smor-
gasbord of delaying tactics already available to attorneys.
In 1983 the rulemakers took a more benign approach than
the drastic one of cutting back on the scope of discovery. Rule
26(b) was amended to impose an obligation on judges to limit
discovery that is either redundant or unduly burdensome
under the circumstances of the action,82 two practices that uni-
78. See Sofaer, supra note 19, at 699. In light of the experience of state
courts and federal district courts that have promulgated rules placing numeri-
cal limits on interrogatories, see P. Connolly, Working Papers: Survey of Nu-
merical Limits on Interrogatories (Federal Judicial Center 1978) (copy on file
with Minnesota Law Review), satellite litigation over whether these limits have
been exceeded also is likely should a comparable proposal be included in the
Federal Rules.
79. See JUDicLL CoymoLs: DiSCOVERY, supra note 43, at 28-29 (527. of sur-
veyed cases reporting no discovery activity); C. ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANC-
TIONS FOR DIscovERY ABusE 17 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1979) (55% of federal
cases surveyed in Atlanta and 62% of those in Chicago having no discovery ac-
tivity) (copy on file with Minnesota Law Review); Sofaer, supra note 19, at 696-
97.
80. See C. ELLINGTON, supra note 79, at 17 (73% of those cases with some
discovery activity having no recorded discovery problem); Brazil, supra note 39,
at 223 n.9 (Chicago small case attorneys reporting discovery problems with eva-
sive or incomplete answers in 47% of their cases over the prior five years, as
opposed to a figure of 75% for larger case attorneys); Sofaer, supra note 19, at
696-97; see also Preliminary Report of the Discovery Committee of the Southern
District of New York, app. A, 11-12 (Aug. 24, 1983) (25% of responding attorneys
reporting that they had experienced no discovery problems in the prior three
years, and 67% reporting they had discovery problems in no more than half
their cases during that period) (copy on fie with Minnesota Law Review).
81. In addition, quantitative and other limits on discovery already have
been instituted by local rule in a number of federal district courts. See T.
GuYER, SURvEY OF LOCAL CIviL DIscovERY PROCEDURES 23-26 (Federal Judicial
Center 1977); P. Connolly, supra note 78, at app. B.
82. Specifically, the amendment authorizes courts to limit discovery when
they determine that
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less bur-
densome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought- or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, tak-
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versally are regarded as being beyond the scope of legitimate
discovery. The amendment also requires attorneys, when mak-
ing a discovery request or response, to certify that their papers
do not transgress either the "stop-and-think principle" or the
proscription against redundant or disproportionate discovery. 83
Of course, this amendment also is heavily dependent on lawyer
cooperation and a willingness on the part of judges to monitor
lawyer behavior and to enforce the standards established by
the new rule.
D. THE WIDER USE OF SANCTIONS
Although judicially imposed sanctions always have been
available to discourage rule violations and attorney misbehav-
ior,8 4 the regime has relied primarily on party-initiated sanction
proceedings with minimal judicial involvement. This is theoret-
ically an attractive model since it conserves judicial resources
for functions that represent a better allocation of a judge's time
and talent. Historically, however, the threat of sanctions has
been virtually a toothless tiger. Lawyers have not sought them,
partly out of a conviction that judges would not award them;
judges have not awarded them, partly because attorneys do not
request them.85 In reality, something akin to a conspiracy of si-
ing into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limi-
tations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (1); see id. 26(b) advisory committee note to 1983 amend-
ment; Miller & Culp, supra note 60, at 25.
83. The attorney must certify that the discovery request, response, or certi-
fication is consistent with the rules and warranted by law, not interposed to
harass or for some other improper purpose, and not unreasonable or unduly
burdensome. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g); see id. 26(g) advisory committee note to
1983 amendment; Liman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. the Quality of Justice:
More is Less, 4 LITIGATION, Fall 1977, at 8, 9, 58 (recommending such a certifica-
tion requirement); Miller & Culp, supra note 60, at 25. But see Sofaer, supra
note 19, at 700-01 (criticizing the certification requirement as unduly burden-
some in most cases). Similarly, other amendments to Rules 7 and 11 strength-
ened the certification provisions with respect to papers other than discovery
documents. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
84. In addition to Federal Rule 37, other sources of authority for imposing
sanctions for abuse of judicial process include Federal Rule 41, various local
rules, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, contempt statutes, and the inherent power of the court.
See R. RODEs, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Federal Judicial Center 1981)
[hereinafter cited as SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2282 (1970); Renfrew, supra note 27, at 267-71.
85. In a 1978 Federal Judicial Center study, attorneys moved for sanctions
in connection with less than one percent of all discovery requests, and judges
ruled on less than half of the motions made. The judges sided with the moving
party in about three-quarters of their rulings, however, usually imposing un-
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lence has been in effect.
Sanctions have been underutilized partly because they
seem to exist at two polar-and equally unattractive-ex-
tremes. On one end of the spectrum are nominal fines, court
costs, and reprimands-wrist slaps not worth an attorney's ef-
fort to seek or a judge's energy to consider or impose. At the
other extreme, harsh remedies, such as striking pleadings or
imposing involuntary dismissals or defaults, have seemed too
draconian to impose on clients for what typically is the misbe-
havior of the attorney or mere procedural failings.86 Only the
ancient Greeks are reported to have killed the messenger who
brought bad news.
Various understandable elements of professional culture
have inhibited the sanction process. Many judges, who usually
come from the same ranks as the attorneys appearing before
them, are slow to penalize attorneys for using adversarial tac-
tics in which they themselves may have indulged when they
were practitioners.87 Moreover, attorneys cannot be expected
to request sanctions against opponents. They must be mindful
of a variation on the golden rule: "Do not seek sanctions
against what is done to you today, for it may be what you will
try on your opponent tomorrow." 88 Finally, much of the delay
is caused by conduct that is neither black nor white. Rather,
discovery activity exists on a continuum that runs from the
genuinely proper to the marginally acceptable to the downright
abusive. Since the point at which discovery becomes cumula-
tive or redundant is indefinite, it is difficult for attorneys to
know when to initiate sanction proceedings or for the court to
conditional sanctions. Judicial Controls: Discovery, supra note 47, at 24-25;, see
also Renfrew, supra note 27, at 271.
86. See, e.g., Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 810 (4th Cir. 1978); McCargo v.
Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 396 (4th Cir. 1976); Aliv. A & G Co., 542 F.2d 595, 597 (2d
Cir. 1976) (Oakes, J., dissenting opinion); Hassenflu v. Pyke, 491 F.2d 1094, 1095
(5th Cir. 1974); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (4th Cir. 1974); Pond v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1972); Flaska v. Little River
Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928
(1968); Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 388 U.S. 919
(1967); Improving Judicial Controls, supra note 49, at 921-37; Sofaer, supra note
19, at 710-13; Note, Federal Pre-trial Practice: A Study of Modification and
Sanctions, 51 GEo. L.J. 309, 342-43 (1963); Comment, Involuntary Dismissalfor
Disobedience or Delay: The Plaintiffs Plight 34 U. CHL L. Rv. 922, 929-30
(1967).
87. See C. ELLmuroN, supra note 79, at 112-113; Improving Judicial Con.
trols, supra note 49, at 927-28; Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for
Complex Litigation, 48 FoRDHAm L. REV. 907, 993 (1980).
88. See Improving Judicial Controls, supra note 49, at 946-47; Brazil, supra
note 39, at 240-43; Renfrew, supra note 27, at 272.
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feel confident enough to step in and order them, especially if
the judge lacks sufficient familiarity with the conduct of the
parties at the time the alleged abuse occurs.
Despite these factors, courts in recent years have indicated
a greater willingness to impose sanctions,8 9 and the recent
amendments to the Federal Rules should encourage this trend.
The increased involvement demanded by the rules, the clear
mandate to judges in Rule 26 to limit disproportionate and re-
dundant discovery, and the encouragement to formulate issues
and facilitate settlement all reflect a plan of measured judicial
intrusion as a check on uncontrolled adversarial delay.9 O Since
judicial involvement in the pretrial process will familiarize the
court with the case as it matures, judges should be in a better
position to evaluate lawyer behavior than they were in the past.
Indeed, ff the system operates as intended, judges should be
able to warn lawyers away from improper activity before it hap-
pens, and lawyers, sensing an increased judicial presence, may
exercise greater restraint than they might have otherwise.
The increased realism, flexibility, and availability of sanc-
tions that may be imposed under the amended rules also
should help to overcome the reluctance of lawyers to invoke
them. Under the new approach to sanctions, the judge is en-
couraged to make the punishment fit the crime by increased re-
liance on cost-shifting.9 1 After all, it really is simple equity to
89. There clearly is a change in the tenor of judicial thinking and pro-
nouncements on the use and propriety of sanctions. Compare Padovani v.
Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1961) (expressing concern that the
overuse of sanctions would place undue emphasis on the pleadings) with Na.
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)
(per curiam) (holding that "the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions pro-
vided by statute or rule must be available to the district court in appropriate
cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant
such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in
the absence of such a deterrent").
The combination of the Supreme Court's decision in National Hockey
League and the increased pressure of crowded dockets has caused lower courts
to make more frequent use of discovery sanctions. See 8 C. WR]Gtrr & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284, at 232-33 (Supp. 1983); Im-
proving Judicial Controls, supra note 49, at 922; Renfrew, supra note 27, at 271,
281-82; Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978
ARIz. ST. L.J. 475, 489 n.67; Werner, Survey of Discovery Sanctions, 1979 Amz.
ST. LJ. 299, 316; Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of
Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1044-47 (1978).
90. For discussions of the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules, see Hall,
New Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69 A.B.A. J. 1640 (1983); Miller &
Culp, supra note 60; Miller & Culp, supra note 5. Although there are as yet no
empirical studies on sanctions under the 1983 amendments, reports received by
the author indicate an increasing use of cost-shifting throughout the country.
91. The Advisory Committee observed that the new language in Federal
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make the one who fouls the nest pay the costs of cleaning it up.
The court no longer is limited to punishing the innocent client
for the sins of a lawyer, hoping that the latter will suffer indi-
rectly.92 Nor need the judge be content to punish the attorney
whose behavior falls short of willfulness or contempt with a
mere slap on the wrist in the form of a published reprimand, a
measure of dubious deterrent force since it hardly is credible
that potential clients leaf through the reporters when selecting
counsel.
The certification requirements imposed on lawyers and the
accompanying higher standards of inquiry and preparation that
must be met in order to satisfy the signer's professional duty
are now to be enforced by the court's imposition of sanctions
on either the party or counsel.93 Since a higher standard of
conduct can be demanded from an attorney than from a lay cli-
ent,9 4 the type of behavior required to trigger sanctions need
not be as culpable as that which warrants dismissal. At least
the court now has the discretion to punish the individual at
fault. Not only does this conform more closely to our notions of
fairness, but it is more likely to have a deterrent effect on fu-
ture abuse.95
Rule 11 regarding sanctions is meant to discourage abuse by "building upon
and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court to award expenses,
including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith." FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note to 1983 amendment. See Roadway Ex-
press, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (discussing inherent power of court to
award attorneys' fees when party conducts litigation in bad faith); Miller &
Culp, supra note 5, at 34 (noting cost-shifting effect of new amendments);
Peckham, supra note 3, at 800-04 (discussing factors to be considered in choos-
ing appropriate sanctions); Sofaer, supra note 19, at 706-710 (observing that
monetary sanctions are a flexible device for targeting sanctions at those indi-
viduals most responsible for discovery abuses).
92. See SANCTIONS I1POSABLE, supra note 84, at 70-79 (explaining sanctions
available for disciplining attorneys for rules violations); Sofaer, supra note 19,
at 710-13 (commenting on propriety of sanctioning attorneys); see also supra
note 86 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 60 & 83 and accompanying text.
94. See Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 462 (8th Cir.
1983) (discussing court's authority to assess costs and attorneys' fees against
an attorney personally); McCandless v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co, 697 F.2d 198,
201 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that "although subjective bad faith should be re-
quired before assessing fees against a party, a lesser standard should be ap-
plied when judging an attorney's conduct"); see also Underwood, Legal Ethics
and Class Actions: Problems, Tactics and Judicial Responses, 71 Ky. L.J. 787,
818-19 (1982-83) (noting that amended Federal Rule 11, with its more demand-
ing certification requirements, could help to deter counsel from filing frivolous
class actions by requiring them to tailor the complaint to the facts of the partic-
ular case rather than relying on discovery to generate a claim).
95. The Supreme Court legitimated the prophylactic purpose of sanctions
in deterring further abuse in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
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Expanding the range of sanctions available to the court
also gives the judge flexibility to attack the particular abuse
with appropriate punishment, rather than limiting the bench
either to harsh measures that will be imposed rarely or to triv-
ial ones that have no significant punitive or deterrent force.
The amended rules give the judge an explicit and implicit man-
date to operate with a scalpel instead of a meat-ax, to tailor the
sanction to the magnitude and form of the abuse. Rather than
dismissing an entire lawsuit for failure to make discovery on a
given issue, an action that is vulnerable to reversal as overly
severe, 96 the judge can direct that the recalcitrant party be es-
topped from denying the truth of the matter asserted by the re-
questing party, thereby limiting the punishment to the matter
that occasioned the abuse.97 Or the court can impose the costs
of proving an issue at trial on a party or attorney who refused
to admit its truth at a pretrial conference in cases in which
there was no good faith basis for not doing so. 98
Use of the pretrial conference procedure to encourage nar-
rowing the issues, to elicit admissions when there is no real
contest as to a question of fact, and to promote settlement 99
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976), thereby encouraging more frequent use of sanc-
tions by the lower courts. See supra note 89.
96. Although Federal Rule 37(b) (2) (C) authorizes a court to dismiss an ac-
tion for disobeying a discovery order, courts are reluctant to impose this severe
sanction in all but the most egregious of situations. See, e.g., Societe Internatio-
nale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v. Brownell, 357
U.S. 197, 212 (1958) (holding that dismissal unwarranted when "failure to com-
ply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of
petitioner"); Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 504 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978) (observing that dismissal improper ab-
sent "flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard" of one's obligation under the
Federal Rules).
97. The Federal Rules authorize a court to punish a discovery violation by
issuing "[a]n order that the matters regarding which the order was made or
any other designated facts shall be taken as established for purposes of the ac-
tion in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order." FED. R. Crv.
P. 37(b) (2) (A). See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704-05 (1982) (affirming lower court's application of
Federal Rule 37(b) (2) (A) to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant
that refused to cooperate with discovery aimed at establishing the requisite
"minimum contacts"); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102
(D.D.C. 1974) (holding that government's failure to disclose FBI files related to
its unlawful electronic surveillance of plaintiff justified deeming as established
certain of plaintiffs damage claims).
98. FED. R. Cry. P. 37(c).
99. The 1983 amendment to Federal Rule 16 broadens the scope of the pre-
trial conference, "shifting the emphasis away from a conference focused solely
on the trial and toward a process of judicial management that embraces the en-
tire pretrial phase, especially motions and discovery." FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a) ad-
visory committee note to 1983 amendment. A concrete example of this
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also is reenforced in the new rules by an explicit mandate to
ensure compliance through the use of sanctionsOO This is cer-
tain to broaden the range of conduct that now may be consid-
ered improper; conduct formerly seen as a natural part of the
adversary process now may be treated as sanctionable.101
E. SuMMARY
Engraved ethical norms of loyalty to one's client often com-
bine with attorney self-interest to create powerful incentives to
use adversarial tactics to protract pretrial. Since "surplus jus-
tice" accorded to litigants in one action brings about its denial
or delay to others waiting in the courthouse queue, however,
we no longer can afford to leave the enforcement of standards
of litigation conduct in the hands of private parties. The judi-
cial system-indeed, society at large-has an independent in-
terest in how our court resources are used. If conditions
continue to deteriorate, we might as well chisel off the legend
above the Supreme Court's door, "Equal Justice Under Law,"
and replace it with a sign that says, "Closed-No Just, Speedy,
or Inexpensive Adjudication for Anyone."
emphasis on case management is the new requirement that a judge issue,
within 120 days of filing, a scheduling order setting time limits for joinder of
parties, amendment of pleadings, filing and hearing of motions, and completion
of discovery for all cases except those exempted by local rule. FED. R. CIV. P.
16(b). See N. WEEKS, DmiCnT COURT IPLEMENTATION OF AMENDED FEDERAL
CIVIL RULE 16: A REPORT ON NEw LocAL RuLEs (Federal Judicial Center 1984);
Hall, supra note 90, at 1642-43; Miller & Culp, supra note 60, at 23-24; Sofaer,
supra note 19, at 691-92.
100. A new addition to Rule 16 makes it clear that discovery sanctions avail-
able under Federal Rule 37 may be imposed for disobeying a scheduling or pre-
trial order or for failing to appear, appearing unprepared to participate, or
failing to participate in good faith at a scheduling or pretrial conference. FED.
R. Crv. P. 16(f). See Hall, supra note 90, at 1643; Miller & Culp, supra note 60, at
24; Sofaer, supra note 19, at 692-93.
101. In an attempt to encourage attorneys to engage in more serious evalua-
tions of the prospects for settlement, the Advisory Committee proposed an
amendment to Federal Rule 68 that would subject a party failing to accept a
settlement offer that proved to be more advantageous than the judgment actu-
ally obtained to mandatory true-cost sanctions, including attorneys' fees and
prejudgment interest. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 361-67 (1983). The proposal drew an
enormous amount of comment, much of which was negative. As a result, the
Advisory Committee redrafted the proposal and recirculated it to the bench
and bar in the fall of 1984. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 F.R.D. 423 (1984). The new proposal
would impose sanctions only for an unreasonable failure to accept a settlement
offer and give district judges greater flexibility.
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V. THE RISKS OF CONCENTRATING ON THE
IMPROVEMENT OF SYSTEMIC EFFICIENCY
There are potential difficulties with the suggested concen-
tration on systemic reform, however. Although we cannot accu-
rately predict their severity at this time, they nonetheless
should be identified in the hope that any pernicious side effects
of reorientation of attorney obligations, judicial management,
imposition of sanctions, and preoccupation with efficiency can
be minimized. The first question is whether anyone will pay at-
tention to the new attitudes embodied in provisions such as the
1983 amendments to the Federal Rules. The success of this ex-
periment depends on the active participation of lawyers and
judges, which in turn depends in large measure on the percep-
tion that the burdens these changes impose on bench and bar
are worth the efforts they entail.
There is reason to be optimistic. The frustration through-
out the profession with cost and delay has created a wide-
spread feeling that something must be done about it. This
mood, coupled with a clear message from the Supreme Court
that deterrence is a legitimate purpose for imposing sanctions
for discovery abuse, 0 2 should increase judicial willingness to
set standards of conduct and to punish violations by imposing
sanctions with bite. Moreover, a promanagement philosophy is
encouraged in federal district court judges through training and
educational seminars conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center. These programs, together with the policies enunciated
in the recent amendments to the Federal Rules, will help to es-
tablish the emerging attitudes toward judicial management as
the norm rather than an eccentric deviation.
Also helpful will be a growing understanding that the econ-
omies resulting from streamlining cases often can offset the
time expended in scheduling, managing, and dealing with sanc-
tion requests. This should lead judges to begin thinking of
management as cost-effective rather than as merely another la-
bor-intensive burden. Although we will have to take this prem-
ise on faith until more data and experience are available, there
is reason to believe that it is true and that a growing recogni-
tion of the efficiency of management ultimately will encourage
its use. 0 3
102. See supra notes 89 & 95.
103. See supra note 69 for data on the relationship between case manage-
ment techniques and overall disposition time. Undoubtedly, procedural uni-
formity should save judges time by reducing the amount of training they must
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Another concern is that the frequent invocation of sanc-
tions will create an acrimonious litigation atmosphere. The
truth is that acrimony generated by delay and abuse already
exists. Morale within the profession is not likely to get better if
nothing is done; it is far more likely to get worse.10 4
A related apprehension is that the wider availability of
sanctions will become an attractive plaything for the bar. The
fear is that sanctions will take on a life of their own and, like
some Frankenstein monster, generate satellite litigation. In-
deed, lawyers always can rationalize that professional responsi-
bility requires them to seek cost-shifting sanctions to reduce
their clients' litigation costs.1 05 Unfortunately, litigation has be-
come so uncivilized in many substantive contexts that greater
resort to the sanction process is likely. Thus, it seems realistic
to anticipate a sharp escalation in sanction applications during
the next few years; they even may become the cottage industry
of the remainder of this decade, just as class actions were so
fashionable in the early 1970's. 106 But to the extent that re-
quests for sanctions border on the frivolous, there is reason to
expect that judges, already sensitized to the potential for abuse
through over-litigiousness and weary of its cost in terms of ju-
dicial resources, will give short shrift to unjustified or trivial at-
tempts to exploit the sanction mechanism.10 7
give attorneys who are unfamiliar with the procedures of their particular court.
See S. FtANDERS, supra note 42, at 9. Moreover, the information we have indi-
cates that judges and attorneys have recognized the inefficiency of poor judicial
management and are willing to experiment with ways to improve the situation.
See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
104. See C. ELLIqGTON, supra note 79, at 112-14; Improving Judicial Con-
trols, supra note 49, at 925; Peckham, supra note 3, at 802-03; Renfrew, supra
note 27, at 272; Sofaer, supra note 19, at 717.
105. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. But see Peckham, supra
note 3, at 803 (predicting that freer imposition of monetary sanctions would not
generate satellite litigation because violations of pretrial orders usually are ob-
vious and would not be worth contesting). The Advisory Committee suggested
one way to control the problem of satellite litigation:
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective opera-
tion of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite
litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent
possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record. Thus,
discovery [in sanction proceedings] should be conducted only by leave
of the court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 11 advisory committee note to 1983 amendment.
106. See Miller, supra note 8.
107. See Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 699 F.2d 484
(9th Cir. 1983) (punishing satellite litigation by assessing S1250 damages, in-
cluding attorney fees and costs incurred through appeal), cert. denied 104 S.Ct.
1445 (1984). Courts generally have held, however, that Rule 37 sanction orders
are interlocutory and therefore not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.
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The next concern is that vigorous enforcement of the new
rules may have a chilling effect on lawyers. In addition to curb-
ing abuse, the obligations imposed by lawyer certification, judi-
cial management, and the threat of sanctions might cause some
lawyers to think, double-think, and triple-think themselves into
paralysis. This might inhibit some of the greatest attributes of
the American legal profession-its innovativeness, creativity,
tenacity, and independence. But the advocate's obligation to
represent a client vigorously always has been subject to the
stricture that representation be accomplished within the limits
of the system. The procedural codes and the principles of pro-
fessional responsibility 08 codify those limits and should be
obeyed in letter and spirit. Enforcement of the new behavioral
rules need not gut creativity; in the hands of sensitive judges
they merely will mark the limits of permissible lawyer behavior
as have the earlier legal restraints.109
The requirement that lawyers "stop and think" before they
act and the limits on redundant and disproportionate discovery
need not exclude opportunities for good faith but aggressive
advocacy and representation. Standards for controlling exces-
sive contrariety need not restrain attorneys to that which is
tried, true, and pedestrian." 0 Moreover, those who choose to
§ 1291. This is true whether sanctions are imposed against a party, see, e.g.,
Johnny Pflocks, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 634 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980)1
but see IBM v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 127-30 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974), or against an attorney, see, e.g., East-
ern Maico Distributors, Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, 658 F.2d 944, 948-49 (3d
Cir. 1981).
108. The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct state the attorney's obli-
gation to the system more affirmatively than does the Model Code. Compare
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.2 (1983) ("A lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the cli-
ent.") with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmILrY DR 7-102(A)(1)
(1980) ("A lawyer shall not ... fie a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense
[or] delay a trial . . . when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."). Moreover, the
Model Rules contain a provision, which has no Model Code counterpart,
prohibiting lawyers from "mak[ing] a frivolous discovery request or fail Iing] to
comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d) (1983).
109. See Renfrew, supra note 27, at 274.
110. The Advisory Committee expressed this view with respect to the addi-
tion to Rule 11 regarding sanctions:
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity
in pursuing factual or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid us-
ing the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by in-
quiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading,
motion, or other paper was submitted....
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee note to 1983 amendment. The reasoning
in various court cases echoes this view. See, e.g., Overnite Transportation Co. v.
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become lawyers-especially litigators-are not likely to lose
their advocate's instincts or zeal out of a fear of sanctions.
Ultimately, we have to have confidence that trial judges
will apply the new rules in ways that carry out their underlying
purposes. -We must rely on them to distinguish legitimate ad-
vocacy from illegitimate harassment or attrition and to avoid
overkill by calibrating sanctions to fit the character of the con-
duct. By and large, our historic reliance on the good sense and
discretion of trial judges has not been misplaced.
Having said that, however, it is important to understand
that we are changing the traditional role of the judge. The de-
gree of judicial participation in, and familiarity with, the case
that extensive management implies is a substantial departure
from the centuries-old image of the judge as passive overseer of
the process. Changes in the amount of knowledge the judge is
expected to have about the parties and the action as well as in
the judge's role in encouraging admissions of uncontested is-
sues, shaping and limiting discovery, and promoting settlement
raise the specter of a judge with too much power, too much fa-
miliarity with the parties, and too much of an emotional stake
in the outcome."' The fear, of course, is that a judge who has
been scrapping in the trenches with the litigants throughout
pretrial is ill-suited to rule objectively on discovery motions or
to preside at trial. In the words of one commentator, "Although
the sword remains in place, the blindfold and scales have all
but disappeared."" 2
The goal of judicial neutrality, however, does not require
judicial ignorance. The notion that justice is or ought to be
blind should extend only to ensuring impartiality." 3 The argu-
ment that neutrality and fairness must entail know-nothing-
Chicago Industrial Tire Co., 697 F.2d 789, 794-95 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant not
entitled to costs since plaintiff's claim, a matter of first impression, was not friv-
olous); Cheng v. GAF Corp., 713 F.2d 886, 890-92 (2d Cir. 1983) (no award of at-
torneys' fees to defendant since plaintiff's attempts to disqualify opposing
attorney not unreasonable).
111. See Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L REv. 376, 426-31 (1982) (ar-
guing that judges acting as pretrial case managers are tainted for later adver-
sarial adjudication); see also Improving Judicial Controls, supra note 49, at 887
(explaining as one source of judges' reluctance to manage discovery their "con-
cern about preserving their impartiality, both in fact and in the eyes of counsel
and litigants"). Professor Resnick's position is sharply criticized by the Circuit
Executive for the Second Circuit in Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to
Professor Resnick, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984).
112. Resnick, supra note 111, at 431.
113. See Textor v. Board of Regents, N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1396 (7th Cir.
1983) (noting that generally "an opinion formed from contact with a case is not
the type of personal prejudice that disqualifies a judge").
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ness carried ad absurdum would have the judge approach each
discrete issue in an action with an absolutely clean slate and an
empty head. So long as a record of contacts with the judge is
kept and the parties can put allegations of improper prejudice
on the record,114 there is no reason to fear the judge's familiar-
ity with the action. What point is there in delivering a sanction
scalpel capable of being employed to fit the punishment to the
abuse with precision and delicacy, only to blindfold the
surgeon?115
The chance of impaired judicial neutrality and the other
dangers inherent in the "Brave New World of Management" at
least are obvious to us. These are potential corruptions embed-
ded in any system of justice imbued with a substantial element
of discretion. To a large degree we are familiar with these risks
and know how to deal with them. Although we must rely heav-
ily on the conscientiousness and sound judgment of trial court
judges to avoid unfair prejudice, we also have the policing ca-
pabilities of appellate courts and the knowledge that their over-
sight will be triggered by the protests of injured parties and
counsel."l 6
The more insidious danger lies in the possibility of a casual
and unconsidered debilitation of the adversary system through
the overzealous pursuit of the very end we seek to achieve-
the swift, efficient, and fair resolution of lawsuits. Strong judi-
cial management is a potential threat to the adversary system
as it has existed for hundreds of years because it calls for a sig-
nificant change in the power relationship between judges and
lawyers and in their respective functions." 7 Indeed, there are
risks in imposing a meaningful duty on attorneys to act in the
114. Cf Resnick, supra note 111, at 432-33 (proposing that the Federal Rules
be amended "to prohibit ex parte communications and to require judges to con-
duct all meetings with litigants on the record").
115. When there is reason to believe that the neutrality of the judge genu-
inely has been impaired, the case can be transferred to another judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 144 (1982) (providing for disqualification on the grounds of personal
bias or prejudice). This leaves the parties in no worse position than had the
original judge been uninvolved all along; in both situations the judge has none
of the familiarity with the case that sometimes is quite helpful. Since there is
no cure-all for this problem, one must rely on the sound discretion of judges
both to preserve a measure of impartiality and to bow out gracefully when they
are unable to do so. Cf. Slberman, supra note 33, at 1106-07 (use of magistrates
during pretrial stage facilitates isolation of judges from potentially prejudicial
influences).
116. See Hall, supra note 90, at 1643 (pointing out reviewability of sanction
impositions). But see supra note 107 (sanction orders not immediately
appealable).
117. See Resnick, supra note 111, at 380-86 (describing the "traditional judi-
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interests of the judicial system, rather than exclusively in that
of their clients, and in placing enforcement of that duty in the
hands of judges, whose primary concern could well become effi-
ciency rather than justice itself.l18 This could have an impact
on our adjudicatory system that we do not contemplate and
may come to regret. A mystique of disposition tIber alles may
be effective in keeping the docket current, but the price tag
probably is too high.
The adversary system is merely a mechanism for seeking a
fair adjudication of disputes; it is not an end in itself. Thus it
should be flexible and, perhaps, yield if a more accurate and ef-
ficient procedure emerges. But we must remain vigilant and
aware of the implications of what we are doing, lest we wake
up some day years hence with the realization that we unthink-
ingly have presided over the dismantling of the adversary sys-
tem and replaced it with something quite different from
"Justice American-style."
VI. THE NEED FOR ACTION
Far more expensive than any of the concerns just men-
tioned, however, would be paralysis. The price we pay in terms
of damage to the morale of judges, court administrators, and
users of the system for letting private litigants proceed un-
checked is more than we can afford. The quality of our justice
depends on the character of the personnel we are able to at-
tract as judges and on how long they endure. In the long run
the frustration created by the present state of affairs will de-
prive the system of considerable talent, both by motivating
judges to resign early and by deterring potential candidates
from serving at all. Judgeships compete with the high salaries
of private practice and the prestige and autonomy of academia.
The chief attractions of the bench are nonmonetary. If we want
to prevent the quality of our judiciary from declining to an
unacceptably low level, we must pay attention to the in-
tangibles of the job-both its rewards and its frustrations.'19
Beyond its impact on the judiciary, the failure to experi-
ment with ways of combatting cost and delay constitutes an in-
cial role"); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text (duty of lawyer to
system). But see Flanders, supra note 111.
118. Compare Resnick, supra note 111, at 431 ("Case processing is no longer
viewed as a means to an end, instead, it appears to have become the desired
goal") with S. FLANDERS, supra note 42, at 68-70 (stressing correlation between
speed of handling cases and quality of justice).
119. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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estimable disservice to the public. Its negative impact goes far
beyond affecting the right of specific litigants to have their
grievances determined promptly and in the fairest manner fea-
sible. For many, the courthouse is considered a forum in which
quiet reason and unselfish compassion combine to resolve dis-
putes in a violence-free atmosphere. At a time when there are
grave doubts about our ability to achieve social justice through
the normal processes of government, a breakdown in the pub-
lic's confidence in the judicial system or the development of a
widespread conception of its being paleolithic in character
could be catastrophic.
Yet, there already are signs of a debilitation in public confi-
dence and a growing alienation with the system. Unfortu-
nately, these signals are going largely unheeded. Many
commercial disputants have forsaken the courts in favor of
other conflict-resolving institutions, such as arbitration and pri-
vate, quasi-judicial proceedings, that are believed to be more
efficient and better able to provide decisions more attuned to
the realities of the business world. Minority groups increas-
ingly cry out that, far from being blind, justice simply is
stacked in favor of those members of the establishment whose
ancestors long ago fabricated the existing framework to protect
themselves and their property interests and who now continue
to use it as a shield to preserve their private fiefdoms. The ef-
forts of legal aid societies and social action lawyers throughout
the country to convince the disadvantaged that the law can be
a weapon of redress thus far has made only modest headway.
Accordingly, the faith of the poor and disadvantaged in the
majesty of the law, kindled thirty years ago by Brown v. Board
of Educationl2O and other cases of that generation, is now being
extinguished. Because of the primitive way in which our courts
operate and the lack of any immediate prospect that some
white-hatted posse will appear to head the disastrous possibil-
ity of systemic calcification off at the pass, it would be uncon-
scionable to continue to ignore any potentially productive
avenue for streamlining the functioning of our courts.
The time has come for the legal profession to respond to
forces more constructive than "the winds of change." The his-
toric genial anarchy at the courthouse must give way to ra-
tional reform. Ironically, whether we are goaded into serious
action may depend on a realization that the only prospect more
unacceptable than doing the wrong thing is doing nothing. But
120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("separate but equal" inherently unequal).
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recognizing that we must act should not blind us to the possi-
ble harms that "reforms" may bring. These could stem from
distortion or subordination of our aims or through prejudice,
abuse, or ineffectiveness. We must remain alert to the perils of
pursuing our objectives too effectively-of being too good at
what we are about. After all, what purpose is there in making
the trains run on time if they do not take us where we want to
go?

